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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter is a draft of Chapter 7 of a planned book, Preschool and Jobs: Human Development 
as Economic Development, and Vice Versa. This book analyzes early childhood programs’ effects on 
regional economic development. Four early childhood programs are considered: 1) universally accessible 
preschool for four-year-olds of similar quality to the Chicago Child Parent Center program; 2) the 
Abecedarian program, which provides disadvantaged children with high-quality child care and preschool 
from infancy to age five; 3) the Nurse Family Partnership, which provides low-income first-time mothers 
with nurse home visitors from the prenatal period until the child is age two; and 4) the Parent Child-Home 
program, which provides home visits and educational toys and books to disadvantaged families when the 
child is between the ages of 2 and 3.  
 
The book considers the main benefit of state economic development to be the resulting increase 
in earnings of the original residents who stay in that state. Early childhood programs increase residents’ 
earnings largely by increasing the quantity and quality of local labor supply. These programs will increase 
the employability and wages of former child participants in these programs. The book compares the 
effects on local earnings of early childhood programs with the effects of business incentives (e.g., 
property tax abatements). Business incentives increase local residents’ earnings by increasing the quantity 
and/or quality of local labor demand. 
 
This chapter considers a problem with early childhood programs: their effects on earnings are 
mostly long-delayed. The delay occurs because most earnings effects are on former child participants. 
The chapter considers appropriate discounting of benefits. The chapter considers how the upfront costs of 
early childhood programs can be delayed or reduced. The chapter considers how the long-run benefits of 
early childhood programs can be moved up or increased. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, early childhood education programs have a different timing of 
economic development benefits than business incentives. Business incentives deliver sizable economic 
development benefits almost immediately. Jobs are attracted, which immediately increases employment 
rates and upgrades many state residents to better jobs. In contrast, most benefits of early childhood 
programs are long delayed. There are some economic development benefits in the short term. Free child 
care and other services to parents increase parental labor supply. Spending more money stimulates the 
state economy. But these short-term economic development benefits are modest.  During the years right 
after these programs are begun, earnings of state residents go up by only 20 to 30 percent of program 
costs.  Annual earnings effects of these programs do not exceed annual costs until at least 20 years later. 
(Figure 7.1, which reproduces Figure 4.2, shows the time pattern of effects.) These delays in benefits 
occur because so much of the benefits are due to the improved the adult labor supply of former child 
participants. Better child development’s benefits are only achieved in the long run. 
The delayed benefits from early childhood programs raise two issues. First, how should 
policymakers weight future benefits versus current costs? I will argue that policymakers should not 
discount future benefits too much. However, policymakers often do drastically discount or disregard 
social benefits that are in the future. This leads to the second issue. Given that policymakers discount the 
future too much, what can be done to encourage policymakers to adopt early childhood programs? How 
can we get policymakers to adopt programs that are socially beneficial but politically unattractive because 
their benefits are delayed? Various approaches will be discussed to making such programs more 
attractive. We can work on costs. Short-run costs can be postponed or reduced. Alternatively, we can 
work on benefits. Long-run benefits can be shifted towards the present. Short-run benefits can be 
increased.      
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DISCOUNTING 
What social discount rate should be used for evaluating public policies? This question has been 
extensively debated in the economics literature. Recently, the debate over discount rates has been re-
ignited in discussing environmental issues. Environmental issues such as global warming often involve 
trade-offs between short-run costs and long-run environmental benefits. The discount rate used to 
compare future benefits with current costs makes a big difference in whether specific policies pass a 
benefit cost test. Low social discount rates support stringent environmental policies. High social discount 
rates support lax environmental policies.    
For this book, I assume we are determining a discount rate for comparing consumption over time. 
What is the value of a dollar of consumption a year from now, or 10 or 30 years from now, compared to a 
dollar of consumption today?1 
The relative value of future consumption versus current consumption should depend on several 
factors. First, it should depend on how fast one expects per capita consumption to increase. If per capita 
consumption will increase more rapidly over time, then people in the future will have higher per capita 
consumption. Other things equal, this reduces the social value of an extra dollar of consumption in the 
future versus a dollar today. Extra consumption for relatively rich future persons is not worth as much as 
extra consumption for relatively poor current persons. Second, the value of future versus current 
consumption should depend on how one assumes the social value of extra consumption declines with 
higher per capita consumption. Most economic models assume some growth of per capita consumption 
over time. If one assumes that the value of an extra dollar of consumption dramatically declines as per 
capita consumption declines, then future changes in consumption should be downweighted more heavily. 
Third, it is possible that there is some inherent bias toward current consumption over future consumption. 
Even if per capita consumption did not increase over time, it is possible that many people would value a 
dollar of consumption today more than a dollar of consumption in the future.2 
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The discount rates used in this book should be compatible with the growth rate of per capita 
consumption that I assume. For this book, I assumed a rate of growth of real wages (and hence per capita 
consumption) of 1.2 percent per year. We could assume different rates of per capita consumption growth. 
But then we would need to adjust future earnings flows as well. For this discussion, I hold real wage 
growth and per capita consumption growth constant at 1.2 percent per year. 
However, there are many possible assumptions about how rapidly the social value of 
consumption declines as per capita consumption increases. There are also different assumptions about 
how much the present should be inherently preferred to the past, even if per capita consumption were the 
same.  
The debate over global warming has involved different assumptions about these determinants of 
discount rates. Sir Nicholas Stern, the lead author of the well-known Stern Review prepared for the 
British government on policy toward global warming, adopted assumptions that led to a relatively low 
discount rate. Some of the American critics of the Stern Review, such as economists William Nordhaus 
and Martin Weitzman, adopted assumptions that led to somewhat higher discount rates. 
In addition, the lead American academic journal on public policy recently published an article 
that made other assumptions about discount rates. The article was titled “Just Give Me a Number! 
Practical Values for the Social Discount Rate” (Moore et al. 2004). The article tries to provide 
assumptions that would lead to some consensus on the social discount rate. 
For the current book, I explored how it makes a difference to follow all these varying 
assumptions about discount rates. However, I adjusted all these discount rates to this book’s assumption 
of a 1.2 percent annual growth rate in real wages. Under that wage growth scenario, the Stern Review’s 
assumptions imply a social discount rate of less than 2 percent. The Nordhaus and Weitzman assumptions 
imply social discount rates of 3.9 percent and 4.4 percent. The Moore et al. assumptions imply a social 
discount rate of 2.2 percent. Finally, this book’s baseline estimates assumed a social discount rate of 3 
percent.  
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How do these discount rates affect the benefits and costs of business incentives and early 
childhood programs? Table 7.1 shows ratios of benefits to costs for these programs under various 
discount rates. Two points about these results: first, as one would expect, the higher discount rates of 
Nordhaus or Weitzman make the early childhood programs look somewhat worse relative to business 
incentives. Higher discount rates mean that the future adult earnings of former child participants are not 
weighted as highly. Second, under all these discount rates, the present value of increased earnings for 
state residents exceeds the cost of the program. Therefore, even under assumptions that yield relatively 
high discount rates, these early childhood education programs still make sense. Benefits for former child 
participants are so large that even high discount rates do not make these benefits unimportant. 
Another possible way to analyze these different policies is in terms of their “rate of return.” The 
“rate of return” of a proposed public policy is the maximum discount rate at which the project is still 
worth pursuing. This maximum rate of return helps reveal whether the project would be worth doing 
under more extreme assumptions about appropriate discount rates. As is well-known in benefit cost 
analysis, this “rate of return” should not be used to rank projects. The present value, calculated using the 
correct discount rate, should be used to rank projects. The discount rate’s purpose is to give the correct 
value of consumption at different points of time.   
Table 7.2 shows these rate of return calculations. Business incentives and early childhood 
programs are all worth doing unless social discount rates exceed 6 percent or so. Such high discount rates 
are implausible. 
This discussion focuses on what policymakers should do. Research on the social discount rate 
suggests that policymakers should discount the future, but not too much. Therefore, policymakers should 
be willing to implement early childhood programs, even though much of their benefits are far in the 
future.  
Unfortunately, this is probably not the way many state, local, and federal policymakers actually 
view the world. These early childhood education programs do not have benefits exceeding costs for the 
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remaining political career of most policymakers. In the short run, while the policymakers considering 
these programs are in office, these early childhood programs have benefits that fall far short of costs.  
It is quite possible that many policymakers have implicit discount rates that exceed 10 percent. 
Research by Larry Summers and James Poterba in 1994 suggests that corporate executives have discount 
rates when they evaluate investment projects of 12 percent. Government policymakers might be at least as 
short-sighted. If policymakers’ discount rates are 10 percent or greater, the value of the earnings benefits 
from early childhood programs will fall short of these programs’ costs.    
Can anything be done to change the net benefits of early childhood programs, as perceived by 
policymakers? We could simply argue for adopting a long-term perspective. However, changing such 
underlying attitudes is difficult. Political pressures encourage policymakers to worry about reelection.  
A more politically feasible alternative is to adjust the benefits and costs of early childhood 
programs to increase their short-term payoff. Short-term costs can be postponed or otherwise reduced. 
Long-term benefits can be shifted toward the short term, or short-term benefits can be otherwise 
increased. The rest of this chapter considers the options for increasing the short-term economic 
development payoff of early childhood programs.  
REDUCING SHORT-RUN COSTS: POSTPONING COSTS THROUGH BORROWING 
One obvious way to reduce short-run costs of early childhood programs is to finance the 
programs through borrowing. Borrowing delays program costs, allowing the timing of costs to better 
match the timing of economic development benefits. 
Borrowing is generally accepted as a way for the government to pay for “physical capital”: roads, 
public buildings, prisons. The rationale for this borrowing is that it allows the costs of building or 
rehabilitating physical capital to be better matched to the stream of benefits from such capital. For 
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example, building a new highway has large up-front costs. Yet its benefits will be received for many 
years to come.    
Allowing borrowing for early childhood programs would put these programs on a more level 
playing field with business incentives. Business incentive programs can postpone many of their costs by 
promising future incentives to business. Because these programs can postpone costs, they become more 
attractive to policymakers. 
However, most state constitutions severely restrict public borrowing, except for the building or 
redevelopment of tangible physical capital. In most states, it would be illegal for the government to sell a 
30-year bond to pay for early childhood education.   
State and local governments have come up with creative ways of borrowing to get around these 
constitutional restrictions. States have sometimes securitized streams of revenues they will receive from 
dedicated sources. For example, states have sold off revenues they will receive from the settlement with 
tobacco companies to finance public programs (Sindelar and Falba 2004; Scheppach 2003). Some states 
have sold off the rights to collect tolls on a public highway to finance public programs (Burwell and 
Puentes 2009). 
In economic development policy, one common program is tax increment financing (TIF) (Dye 
and Merriman 2006). In a TIF, the increase in property tax revenue in a particular geographic area is 
dedicated to a special TIF fund. For example, this geographic area might be a downtown area. This 
dedicated revenue can only be used for purposes determined by the authority overseeing the TIF district. 
It is common to use TIF revenues as backing for bonds that are sold to finance various public 
improvements in the TIF district. For example, in a downtown area, the TIF revenues might be used to 
finance parking ramps, or for marketing the downtown. 
TIFs are being used in more creative ways. Of particular relevance here is that TIFs are starting to 
be used for educational programs. Michigan recently passed a “Promise Zone” law, which was inspired 
by the Kalamazoo Promise. Under the Kalamazoo Promise, private donors guaranteed to pay up to four 
 7
years of tuition at Michigan public universities and community colleges for all graduates of Kalamazoo 
Public Schools. The Michigan “Promise Zone” law allows for TIF zones to be created to help finance 
similar programs in other areas of Michigan. A school district or some other local government can 
develop a plan to provide free college tuition to all students within the district or government jurisdiction. 
If this plan is approved by the state of Michigan, the plan can in part be funded by TIFs. The tax 
increment received by a school district or other local government jurisdiction would be diverted from the 
state education property tax in that designated area. The plan would receive the state education property 
tax revenue from the increase in property values in the designated area.   
Similar TIFs could be created to finance early childhood education. Some portion of the 
increment in a tax’s revenue could be dedicated to a fund to support early childhood education. The 
incremental tax revenue would not have to necessarily be property tax revenue. Early childhood TIFs 
could be financed with incremental revenue from the sales tax or income tax.  The dedicated revenue in 
that fund could be used to support bond issues to pay the upfront costs of early childhood education.  
What objections might be raised to borrowing for early childhood education? One is that 
borrowing only makes sense if the early childhood education does produce sizable future benefits. If the 
early childhood program does not produce sizable long-run benefits, then it would be a mistake to borrow 
to pay its costs. 
A second objection is that allowing borrowing for operating costs of public programs, even 
highly desirable programs, might lead to abuses. There are good historical reasons why state constitutions 
often restrict public borrowing.  In the early nineteenth century, American states were extraordinarily 
active in borrowing. This borrowing was often used to support corporations that promoted state economic 
development, such as investments in canals, railroads, and banks. However, this large-scale borrowing led 
to eight states defaulting on their debts during the economic downturn of the 1840s. Subsequent state 
constitutional amendments put significant limitations on state debt issuance and investment in 
corporations (Wallis 2000). 
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A third objection is that the current period does not seem the most favorable time to expand any 
entity’s ability to issue debt. The recession that began in 2008 is widely attributed to excessive promotion 
of overly risky debt by many different financial institutions and government agencies. The financial 
system might not be ready for new forms of government financing. The political winds might not support 
such government borrowing. 
It is somewhat disconcerting that a few years ago, Citigroup was promoting financing early 
childhood education with debt financing. In October 2006, the managing director of the Student Loan 
Group of Citigroup made a presentation to a group of early childhood advocates on this topic (Sheldon 
2006). According to the meeting summary, the Citigroup director pointed out that “because early care 
education spending is a capital formation expenditure …, an optimal way for society to pay for ECE costs 
would be to match the repaying of cash to the time when benefits are received … He proposed this might 
be accomplished via a financing mechanism similar to the federal government’s student loan program … 
[U]nder such an arrangement, the same entities (parents, federal, and state governments) that currently 
pay for early education would be responsible to pay under [this new financing] proposal” (Invest in 
Kids/PAES 2006).  These are all cogent points. However, now does not seem the best time for new 
creative financing schemes.  
REDUCING SHORT-RUN COSTS: POSSIBLE OFFSETS FROM REDUCED SPECIAL ED 
COSTS 
One significant short-run cost offset to early childhood programs is reduced special education 
costs. High-quality early childhood education programs have been shown to significantly reduce the 
percentage of students in K–12 special education. For example, the Perry Preschool Program reduced 
special ed. assignments for mental impairment from 35 percent in the control group to 15 percent in the 
treatment group (Schweinhart et al. 2005).  Reductions of about half as much in special ed. assignments 
were found in the Chicago Child Parent Center program: 25 percent to 14 percent (Reynolds et al. 2002).  
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The more intensive and more expensive Abecedarian program had somewhat larger effects on special ed. 
assignments:  48 percent to 25 percent (Masse and Barnett 2002).3  
Reducing special ed. assignments even modestly can yield significant cost savings. Special 
education is expensive. It is estimated that special ed. assignment costs an average of over $10,000 per 
year per special ed. student. This is an extra $10,000 cost above regular education costs (Parrish et al. 
[2004, Part II]; updated to 2007 dollars using the CPI). These special education costs can extend over 
many years, from kindergarten through high school (and even beyond in some cases). Because special 
education costs so much per year and extends for many years, the cost savings from reducing special 
education assignments can be large. 
Early childhood education might also cause other savings for the education system, social welfare 
system and criminal justice system. However, in the present context, we are focusing on cost savings that 
are short term. Reducing grade retention saves costs only in the long run. The savings from reduced 
criminal activity also take many years to be realized. Savings in child welfare costs from reduced abuse 
and neglect cases may be more immediate. However, the evidence suggests that such savings for the child 
welfare system are small relative to special education cost savings. For example, for the Chicago Child 
Parent Center program, cost savings for the child welfare system are only 11 percent of estimated cost 
savings from reduced special education costs (Reynolds et al. 2002). Estimates for the Nurse Family 
Partnership also suggest modest fiscal savings from reduced child welfare system costs (Aos et al. 2004, 
Technical Appendix, p. 96). 
I added reduced special education costs into my simulation model of universal preschool and a 
full-scale Abecedarian program. I used this revised simulation model to recalculate the flows of benefits 
versus costs of these programs over time. This revised simulation model calculates “net costs” of these 
early childhood programs for each time period. These net costs subtract out the reduced special education 
costs.4 
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Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the results.5 As the figures show, the ratio of economic development 
benefits to net costs increase significantly.  Calculations suggest that the ratio of the present value of 
earnings benefits for state residents, to net fiscal costs, increases from 2.78 to 4.24 for universal 
preschool. For the Abecedarian program, this ratio increases from 2.25 to 3.21.  
However, the short-term perspective on these programs only modestly improves. For example, 
under these revised calculations which consider reduced special education costs, it takes 20 years after 
universal preschool is implemented for annual economic development benefits to exceed annual net costs. 
(In terms of the figure, this happens when the ratio of annual economic development benefits to net costs 
exceeds one.) This is an improvement over the baseline calculations. In the baseline calculations, it took 
24 years for economic development benefits to exceed costs. However, 20 years is still a long time for 
economic development benefits to dominate costs.  
In addition, during the first 10 years or so, the ratio of benefits to net costs only modestly 
improves due to considering special ed. cost savings. For example, 10 years after the universal preschool 
program is begun, annual benefits are 17 percent of net costs, up from 16 percent in the original 
simulation.   
For the Abecedarian program, under these revised calculations, it takes 16 years for annual 
economic development benefits to exceed annual net costs. In the baseline calculations, it took 21 years. 
Sixteen years is a long time to wait for annual economic development benefits to exceed costs. 
In addition, 10 years after a full-scale Abecedarian program is begun, annual economic 
development benefits are 54 percent of net costs. This is only up modestly from the 47 percent figure 
calculated before, which did not consider special education cost savings. 
In sum, even when special ed. cost savings are considered, early childhood programs are only 
attractive to policymakers with the patience needed to take a long-term perspective.  
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REDUCING SHORT-RUN GOVERNMENT COSTS: FINANCING PRESCHOOL OUT OF THE 
K–12 SCHOOL BUDGET 
Obviously universal preschool or other early childhood programs could be financed without 
increasing taxes or borrowing. Some other spending category could be reduced. This budget reallocation 
would promote state economic development if this other spending category has lower economic 
development benefits than high-quality preschool. 
Politically, the most likely spending cut to finance universal preschool would be cutting K–12 
spending. Local school districts are likely sponsors of preschool. If they choose to finance universal 
preschool, and voters are not inclined to increase taxes, then the universal preschool’s costs are implicitly 
being financed by reduced K–12 spending. At the state level, state governments frequently have special 
funds for support for public education spending. In addition, public education spending proposals are 
often considered together as part of a particular appropriation bill. Public education spending proposals 
often are considered together by the same committee. In this political process, achieving increased 
funding for high-quality preschool may involve some reduction in K–12 spending. This reduction may be 
explicit or it may be implicit. Because of expanded preschool spending, K–12 spending may not increase 
as fast as it otherwise would. However, it would be politically naive to deny the possibility of a political 
trade-off between preschool funding and K–12 funding. 
This political trade-off does not reflect any necessary logical consequence of increased preschool 
spending. Increased preschool spending can logically be financed by cutting any spending category, not 
just K–12 spending. We can increase preschool spending without increasing taxes or government 
borrowing by cutting such budget categories as prisons, Medicaid, state employee benefits, etc. However, 
these logical possibilities are less politically likely than financing universal preschool through reduced K–
12 spending. 
Suppose we did finance 100 percent of the costs of universal preschool through reduced K–12 
spending. Then this budget reallocation would have no net government spending cost. The short-term tax 
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costs of increasing preschool spending are eliminated. State policymakers need not worry about proposing 
tax increases to pay for universal preschool.  
But what would be the consequences of this budget reallocation for state economic development? 
Universal preschool increases state economic development largely by increasing the earnings of former 
child participants. K–12 education has similar types of effects on state economic development. The 
quality of K–12 education affects the earnings of former students. The quantity and quality of the labor 
supply of former K–12 students who stay in the state will affect the state’s economic development. A cut 
in K–12 spending may damage the quality of K–12 education, which will adversely affect state economic 
development.  If universal preschool is funded, but K–12 spending is cut, which of these policy changes 
will dominate the state’s future economic development? Will state residents’ earnings increase or 
decrease?     
To address these questions, I used this book’s simulation model to estimate the economic 
development benefits from reallocating K–12 spending to universal preschool. To do so, I needed an 
estimate of how reductions in K–12 spending will affect the earnings of former students.  
For the initial simulations, I used extreme estimates of how large the effects of cutting K–12 
spending could be. I used estimates derived from economist Alan Krueger’s estimates of how spending on 
reduced class size in grades K–2 affected future earnings (Krueger 2003).  
Krueger’s estimates are derived from the Tennessee Class Size Study. This study was a random 
assignment study in which students were randomly assigned to either “normal” K–2 classes that averaged 
22 students or “experimental” lower class sizes that averaged 15 students. The study estimated effects of 
this lower class size on early elementary test scores. Krueger used these test score effects to estimate 
effects on future earnings. For his benefit-cost analysis, he also estimated what percentage increase in K–
2 spending was needed to achieve these results. Under reasonable assumptions, lower K–2 class sizes 
clearly passed a benefit-cost test. For example, under discount rate and wage growth assumptions similar 
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to this book’s assumptions, the present value of future earnings benefits are about three times the extra K–
12 spending costs.6 
Suppose we use Krueger’s estimates to estimate the earnings effects of all changes in K–12 
spending. Krueger’s estimates imply that a 1 percent decrease (increase) in K–12 spending that occurs for 
one year of a student’s K–12 career will decrease (increase) their future earnings by 0.03 percent. This is 
derived by assuming the earnings effects of any change in K–12 spending will be the same as the earnings 
effects of changes in spending on smaller class sizes in grades K–2.7 
I regard this as an extreme estimate of the effects of lower K–12 spending for several reasons. 
First, not everyone accepts Krueger’s estimates. For example, there is an ongoing dispute between 
Krueger and other education researchers such as Eric Hanushek about whether K–12 class size and 
spending has effects as large as those estimated by Krueger (Krueger 2002; Hanushek 2002).  Second, 
even if we accept Krueger’s estimates, it is unlikely that most changes in K–12 spending have as large an 
effect on student learning and future earnings as K–2 class size. Therefore, there are less damaging ways 
to cut the K–12 budget than increasing K–2 class size. As a result, we would expect the future earnings 
effects of an optimal cut in the K–12 budget to be less than the effects estimated by Krueger for K–2 class 
size.  
Financing universal preschool is estimated to cost 3.5 percent of the K–12 budget.8 Therefore, the 
simulations consider the economic development effects of implementing universal preschool by cutting 
the K–12 budget by 3.5 percent.    
Many effects of reduced K–12 spending are long delayed. In the first year, the spending cut only 
reduces the quality of education of students leaving K–12 for one year. Based on the Krueger estimates, a 
cut of 3.5 percent in K–12 spending experienced for only one year will reduce future earnings by only 0.1 
percent (= 3.5 * 0.0296). After two years, this impact doubles. It keeps going up for each successive 
cohort of students for the next 13 years. After 13 years, we have students who have experienced 3.5 
percent lower school funding from kindergarten through 12th grade. Using the Krueger estimates, the 13 
 14
years of lower school funding is estimated to reduce earnings by 1.35 percent. After 13 years, each 
successive cohort of students leaving public schools is estimated to have their lifetime earnings reduced 
by 1.35 percent.9 
These effects on students’ earnings are entered into this book’s simulation model. As was done 
with early childhood programs, I make assumptions, based on reasonable estimates, on how many former 
K–12 students will survive to various ages and how many will stay in their home state. I also make 
similar assumptions that one-third of this change in the state’s labor supply is offset by displacement 
effects.  Students leaving the K–12 labor supply have lower labor force participation and job skills. This 
increases job opportunities for other state residents. These increased job opportunities offset one-third of 
the direct negative effects on state earnings due to students who remain in the state.10 
The reduced K–12 education spending also has some immediate economic development effects. 
Reduced education spending reduces demand for labor in the K–12 sector and also reduces the need for 
taxes to finance the expanded preschool. The reduced K–12 spending offsets 1-for-1 the balanced budget 
multiplier stimulative effects of the original universal preschool simulation. 
Figure 7.4 shows the estimated economic development effects of financing universal preschool 
through reduced K–12 spending. The chart shows the effects of the preschool by itself on the earnings of 
state residents, as a percentage of total state wage and salary earnings. The chart also shows the negative 
effects on state residents’ earnings of reducing K–12 spending. Finally, the chart shows the net effects of 
both changes combined. 
As the figure shows, at first this budget reallocation has little or no net effects on state residents’ 
earnings. However, after about 16 years, this budget reallocation begins to have positive effects on state 
economic development. These positive effects steadily increase until they max out, as a percentage of the 
state economy, at about a 0.85 percent boost to the economy, after about 60 years.  
The negative effects of reduced K–12 spending are estimated to offset about two-fifths of the 
positive effects of universal preschool.11 Why are there gains from this budget reallocation? These gains 
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occur because the estimated effects of universal preschool on child development and adult success are 
significantly greater than the effects of later intervention. One can explain this as due to the inherent 
advantages of earlier intervention. One could also hypothesize that allocating educational dollars to 
increase the time that children spend in school may be somewhat more productive than allocating dollars 
to increase the quality of that time.  
None of this should be construed as meaning that this budget reallocation is the best alternative. 
All the estimates say is that if we assume that the total K–12 plus preschool budget is fixed, reallocating 
funds from K–12 to preschool seems to have net positive effects on state economic development. But 
increasing total spending on preschool and K–12 may also pay off. Recall that Krueger’s estimates show 
a positive benefit-cost ratio for increasing K–12 spending. In the present scenario, earnings benefits are 
scaled back, as I only count earnings effects due to former students who stay in the state, and I assume 
that extra quality of labor supply has some displacement effects. But I still conclude that reducing K–12 
spending has negative economic development effects that are 24 percent greater than the resulting budget 
savings. In this simulation, cutting K–12 spending is a bad idea from a state economic development 
perspective.  
Therefore, the best alternative would be to increase spending for universal preschool and finance 
this in some way other than cutting K–12 spending. Cutting K–12 spending is definitely a “second-best” 
way of financing universal preschool. 
What limitations are there of this simulation? One obvious limitation is that the simulation does 
not allow for any interaction between the universal preschool and reduced K–12 spending. The simulation 
assumes the effects of universal preschool and reduced K–12 spending are additive. But what if the 
effects of universal preschool depend on the level of K–12 spending? Then the effect of the budget 
reallocation will differ from simply adding the two effects. 
It has sometimes been argued that early childhood interventions will have stronger long-term 
effects if these interventions are coupled with a quality K–12 school system. For example, some believe 
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that the effects of the Abecedarian program were enhanced by the relatively high quality of the Chapel 
Hill school system. According to Galinsky, the public school system in Chapel Hill at the time of 
experiment was considered one of the two best public school systems in the state. The Chapel Hill public 
schools had a relatively small percentage of disadvantaged children, and a large number of different 
support services for children who were behind.  
Therefore, it is possible that the estimated impacts of universal preschool will be reduced if the 
quality of subsequent K–12 education is reduced, beyond the prediction from adding up the separate 
effects of these two interventions. In that case, Figure 7.4 may overstate the net benefits of this budget 
reallocation. 
On the other hand, perhaps universal preschool has greater impacts on children when K–12 
school quality is lower. In that case, the combined impact of the budget reallocation will be more positive 
than shown in Figure 7.4.  
Another issue is whether reducing K–12 spending will have the earnings effects estimated by 
Krueger. As mentioned above, it seems plausible that there are better ways to cut the K–12 school budget 
than increasing K–2 class size. For example, in 2006, Mark Tucker and his colleagues at the National 
Center on Education and the Economy advocated that we consider getting rid of at least the senior year in 
high school for most students, as the senior year often seems unproductive. This is just one of many 
possible K–12 changes that could cut spending at lower costs to student achievement and earnings than 
raising early elementary class sizes.  
Appendix 7C to this chapter considers scenarios where the simulation is repeated, but reduced K–
12 spending is assumed to have less adverse achievement effects than assumed by Krueger. As one would 
expect, the resulting net benefits of this budget reallocation then increase. 
Finally, although funding universal preschool through cutting K–12 spending avoids short-run tax 
increases, it does not produce short-run economic development benefits. As the figure shows, under this 
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scenario, there are little economic development benefits for 25 years. This budget reallocation is only 
attractive to a policymaker with great patience.   
INCREASING SHORT-RUN BENEFITS: SHIFTING BENEFITS FORWARD THROUGH 
CAPITALIZATION 
Benefits of early childhood programs would be realized earlier if some of these benefits were 
“capitalized” into higher property values. A state or local government that implements at full-scale a high-
quality early childhood program is providing a service that is valuable to families. The increased future 
earnings of former child participants should be valued by parents. Parents should be willing to pay more 
to obtain access for these future benefits. This willingness to pay could be reflected in a willingness to 
pay more to buy a house or rent an apartment in the state or local area that offers these services. This 
willingness to pay more for housing should increase property values. This increase in property values may 
occur as soon as buyers and sellers of property fully understand the future benefits provided by early 
childhood education. These increased property values do not have to wait for these future benefits to 
occur if sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers of property believe that they will. Therefore, 
capitalization of future earnings benefits into property values could increase the up-front benefits of early 
childhood programs.12 
Of course, the value of property should also reflect the taxes associated with that property. 
However, the economic development argument for early childhood education is that these future earnings 
benefits significantly exceed the costs of financing these programs. Furthermore, as other authors have 
pointed out, early childhood programs provide many medium-run and long-run fiscal benefits. These 
fiscal benefits include the lower special education costs mentioned above. They also include other 
reductions in spending, such as lower criminal justice system costs and lower costs for welfare and 
Medicaid. Fiscal benefits also include increases in taxes due to the increased earnings in the state 
economy. Some simulations suggest that fiscal benefits greatly outweigh the costs of these programs 
 18
(Bartik 2006; Dickens and Baschnagel 2007; Lynch 2007). The medium-run and long-run fiscal benefits 
are great enough that at modest discount rates such as 3 percent, the adoption of these programs has a 
positive net present fiscal value, not a cost. 
How buyers and sellers of property value these short-run fiscal costs versus long-run fiscal 
benefits is uncertain. This may depend in part on how short-run fiscal costs are paid for. If all short-run 
fiscal costs are reflected in higher property taxes, costs may loom larger in property owners’ minds. If 
short-run fiscal costs are financed in ways that are less visible, less tied to property purchases, or less a 
burden on the general taxpayer, then these short-run costs may have less influence on how typical buyers 
and sellers value property. For example, if these short-run costs are financed through higher sales taxes, 
they may be less visible to many households and therefore not affect property bids much. If short-run 
costs are financed through an increase in the top rate on a graduated state income tax, then these costs 
may not affect property bids that much.13   
Will buyers and sellers of property perceive the benefits of early childhood programs as benefits 
that should increase their valuation of property? This seems much more likely for programs such as 
universal preschool than those that provide widespread benefits to many households. On the other hand, it 
seems less likely that property values will go up if early childhood programs only provide benefits to 
relatively few households. Some early childhood programs by design are targeted at relatively few 
households by being targeted at disadvantaged households. This includes programs such as the 
Abecedarian program. It also includes many home visiting programs, such as the Nurse Family 
Partnership or the Parent Child Home Program. 
Whether universal preschool will affect property valuation depends in part on whether it provides 
benefits that are visible to prospective property owners in the state or local area.  Some benefits of 
universal preschool do manifest themselves in the short run in a way that we know is visible enough to 
affect property valuation. Specifically, high-quality preschool will affect elementary school test scores. 
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We know from previous research that elementary school test scores are visible enough and tied enough to 
property ownership to affect property values. 
Studies suggest that universal preschool will increase average test scores in 3rd, 4th, and 5th 
grades by about 0.08 in “effect size” units. This “effect size” jargon of educational researchers means that 
average test scores will increase by eight-hundredths of the typical standard deviation across students in 
test scores.14 Based on previous studies of the housing market, an increase in average test scores in 3rd, 
4th, and 5th grade of one standard deviation probably increases property values by 5 percent to 10 
percent.15 Therefore, due to its effects on average elementary school test scores, universal preschool 
should increase a state or local area’s residential property values by 0.4 to 0.8 percent. This calculation 
assumes that buyers and sellers of property value the increase in test scores, but ignore the possible fiscal 
consequences of universal preschool. As outlined above, fiscal consequences might be ignored because 
these fiscal consequences are on net positive in the long-run, or because these short-run fiscal costs are 
not salient to their property valuation decision.  
Based on typical U.S. property values, if universal preschool raises residential property values by 
0.4 to 0.8 percent, the capital gain from universal preschool will be 5.1 to 10.2 times the annual gross 
budgetary costs of universal preschool.16 If property valuations are unaffected until test scores actually 
improve, then this property value gain will begin to occur when the original preschoolers reach 3rd grade, 
four years after the universal preschool program is adopted. At average U.S. property tax rates, such an 
increased valuation of property would raise property tax revenues of 7 to 14 percent of the annual gross 
costs of the universal preschool program.17 
Universal preschool valuation would have much larger effects on property valuation if buyers and 
sellers of property fully valued its effects on future earnings. This book’s simulations allow a calculation 
of universal preschool’s effects on state residents’ earnings. I can also calculate the effects on the earnings 
of former preschoolers who leave the state. These effects should also be relevant to parents’ property 
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valuation decisions. Combining these calculations, we can calculate the net present value of the increase 
in earnings that can be accessed by buying property in this state.18  
This net present value obviously depends upon the discount rate typically used by buyers and 
sellers of property.  What discount rate might actually be used by prospective buyers and sellers of 
property to value earnings effects that occur for their children? The honest answer is, we don’t know. 
However, we can come up with some plausible alternatives. I consider four alternatives. First, perhaps 
households and prospective homebuyers might act as policymakers are supposed to optimally act 
according to social discount rate theory. For this alternative, I use a discount rate of 3 percent, as this 
book has consistently done for the optimal policy perspective.  A second alternative is to rely on evidence 
of how parents behave in making investments in children. A study of parental investments in children’s 
health estimated a parental discount rate of 4.70 percent (Agee and Crocker 1996). A third alternative is 
to estimate what discount rate is compatible with the finding that a one standard deviation in test scores 
raises property values by 5 to 10 percent. I calculated what discount rate would make this property value 
effect reasonable. I estimated discount rates of 7.50 percent (5 percent property value effect) and 6.06 
percent (10 percent property value effect). Finally, as argued by Barrow and Rouse (2004), we might use 
the average 30 year real interest rate on mortgages. They calculate this to be 7.33 percent. This mortgage 
rate is quite close to the estimated discount rate associated with a 5 percent property value effect. I 
combine these two possible discount rates together in the analysis. 
Table 7.3 uses these plausible discount rates to calculate effects of universal preschool on 
property values and property taxes. I consider two scenarios. Under one scenario, I only consider the 
property value effects of the gross economic development benefits provided by universal preschool. This 
scenario ignores the fiscal effects of universal preschool. It implicitly assumes that the short-run taxes to 
support universal preschool aren’t relevant to property buyers and sellers. Perhaps the taxes are not paid 
by the decisive property buyer or seller. Or perhaps these short-run taxes are perceived as being 
outweighed by the long-run fiscal benefits of preschool in lowering special education costs, criminal 
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justice system costs, and welfare system costs. Under the second scenario, I consider the property value 
effects of universal preschool after subtracting out 100 percent of the program costs for universal 
preschool. No fiscal benefits from universal preschool are considered. In the real world, it seems likely 
that the truth is between these two scenarios. 
These property value effects vary widely. However, these results do support several conclusions. 
First, property value effects of universal preschool are potentially about four times as great as predicted 
by effects on elementary test scores. This estimate is derived by comparing the elementary test score 
effects with the effects of gross economic development benefits using the comparable discount rate. This 
reflects that universal preschool has considerably greater effects on the future earnings of former child 
participants than would be predicted from effects on elementary test scores.  
Second, effects of universal preschool on property values are often large under plausible discount 
rates. Effects are many multiples of annual program costs. The property taxes raised from these higher 
property values are often significant fractions of annual program costs. 
Third, whether such capitalization effects will actually occur obviously depends greatly on how 
property buyers and sellers value universal preschool. This depends in part on whether property buyers 
and sellers have accurate information about the quality of universal preschool. It also depends on whether 
property buyers and sellers understand fully the potential long-run effects of high-quality universal 
preschool. Finally, this valuation depends on how heavily these buyers and sellers discount these benefits 
to children.  
At present, I doubt whether most property buyers and sellers directly value preschool quality in 
their property valuation decisions. I doubt this because information on preschool quality is often weak. 
Furthermore, many property buyers and sellers may not sufficiently understand the effects of preschool 
quality on future earnings of former child participants. Therefore, to the extent that universal preschool 
currently has a property value effect, it is probably mostly indirect, through effects on elementary test 
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scores. Elementary test scores are more widely known by prospective home buyers. Parents do believe 
that such test scores are related to future life prospects for their children.   
However, these valuations of universal preschool by property buyers and sellers may potentially 
be affected by policymakers. Preschool advocates might consider promoting better information for 
prospective homeowners on the quality, availability, and cost of preschool in different states and 
metropolitan areas. Some beginning attempts to provide such information include the State of Preschool 
yearbook by the National Institute for Early Education Research. 
Policymakers might also consider further measures to inform the public about the future earnings 
effects of universal preschool. A fuller understanding of these effects might increase household valuations 
of these earnings effects. 
Finally, public relations efforts that stress how children are affected by early childhood programs 
might alter parental discounting of these effects. Stressing effects on children in public discourse may 
reduce parental discounting of such effects.  
The rationale for increasing parental valuations of preschool’s effects is in part to improve 
parental choice options with better information. But public relations efforts to increase parental valuations 
will also change the incentives facing state policymakers. If preschool quality, availability, and cost 
become more salient to prospective homebuyers, the effects of these factors on property values and 
property tax revenues will increase. This will increase the attractiveness of high-quality universal 
preschool to state and local policymakers who wish to boost their state or local area in the short run. 
Short-run boosts in property values and property tax revenues may be more of an incentive to 
policymakers than long-term boosts to earnings.  
One trade-off with increased capitalization is that it transfers some of the benefits of universal 
preschool education to property owners. This will be further discussed in the chapter on distributional 
effects. 
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Capitalization effects are relevant when universal preschool is analyzed from a state perspective. 
These capitalization effects reflect the relative attractiveness of a given state, versus other states, due to 
the state offering high-quality universal preschool. At the national level, we would not expect nationwide 
universal preschool to lead to capitalization effects. This is further discussed in the chapter on the national 
perspective. 
INCREASING SHORT-TERM BENEFITS: INCORPORATING PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT 
PROGRAMS INTO EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS 
Short-run benefits of early childhood programs may also be increased by program modifications. 
What program components might be added to significantly increase short-run benefits? 
It seems reasonable to focus on program add-ons that might have some synergy with the early 
childhood programs. Otherwise, short-run benefits could be increased by adding any arbitrary program X 
that has a high ratio of short-run benefits to costs. But if program X’s social returns do not depend on the 
existence of the early childhood programs, and vice versa, then it is unclear why we would consider the 
early childhood programs plus program X as a package. For example, perhaps some antipollution 
regulation would have large short-run benefits relative to costs. But it would seem strange to claim that 
we have “solved” the problem of delayed benefits to early childhood programs by adding an antipollution 
regulation to the policy package.  
One program add-on that might have some synergy with early childhood programs is an 
employment and training program for the parents of the child participants. It seems possible that early 
childhood programs that provide some free child care, such as universal preschool and the Abecedarian 
program, might make employment and training services for the parents more effective.  
Employment and training services for parents may provide more short-run economic 
development benefits than the benefits for the child participants in early childhood programs. Increases in 
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parental employment and wages will occur immediately, while improvements for former child 
participants have to wait until the children grow up. 
What are plausible returns to high-quality employment and training programs for the parents of 
the child participants in universal preschool or the Abecedarian program? How might adding on parental 
employment and training programs affect the short-run benefits from an early childhood program 
package? 
We don’t know the answer. There has not been much experimentation to explore the social 
returns to adding parental employment programs to early childhood programs. 
I wanted to gauge the potential for adding on parental programs. To do so, I considered what 
would happen if the add-on parental employment program had a rate of return that matched the highest 
that have been observed for rigorously evaluated employment and training programs. Specifically, I 
assumed the parental employment and training program had returns as high as the estimated effects of Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs on disadvantaged adults. 
JTPA was the main federally funded job training program from 1982 to 1998. It was evaluated by 
a random assignment experiment in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
The random assignment experiment indicated that JTPA had extremely high rates of return for 
adults. The experiment indicated modest effects per trainee on average earnings. Annual earnings for 
trainees increased by over $1,200 (Friedlander et al. 1997, updated to 2007 dollars). The evidence 
suggests that these earnings increases persisted without much change for at least five years after training 
(GAO 1996).19 These increased earnings were achieved at a cost per adult trainee of about $2,000 for 
women and $1,400 for men (Friedlander et al. 1997).  The real rate of return to society from JTPA 
training for adults exceeds 70 percent per year under any reasonable assumptions (Friedlander et al. 
1997). 
Why not consider a training program that had more dramatic effects on annual earnings than 
$1,200? Research suggests that few if any training programs have persistent annual earnings effects for 
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broad groups that exceed the $1,000 to $2,000 range (Bartik 2001, Chapter 4). The annual earnings 
effects for training programs, once they exceed some minimum threshold services per trainees, do not 
significantly increase with program spending per trainee (Greenberg et al. 2003). Therefore, we do not 
know how to reliably produce a training program with dramatically “large” effects on annual earnings per 
trainee, even if we are willing to spend a great deal of money per trainee.  The JTPA program does as 
well as any program in producing high rates of return at modest costs. 
I resimulated the economic development benefits and costs of universal preschool and the 
Abecedarian program with an add-on training program for parents. To do these simulations, I assumed 
that the program had costs per trainee and earnings effects per trainee that were similar to the JTPA 
program’s effects for adult women. I assumed that 75 percent of the families involved with the 
Abecedarian program would enroll in training, as the Abecedarian program targets disadvantaged 
families. I assume that 75 percent of the “high-risk” families enrolled in universal preschool would enroll 
in training, along with 25 percent of “medium-risk” families. This assumption means that 26.3 percent of 
all participants in universal preschool would enroll in training. In calculating increased earnings of state 
residents, I make my usual adjustments to include only survivors who stay in the state, and to adjust for 
labor market displacement. 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the annual ratio of economic development benefits to costs for universal 
preschool and the Abecedarian program, with an adult training add-on. For comparison, the figures also 
show the annual ratios without the adult training add-on. The numbers behind the figures are in Appendix 
7D. 
As shown in Figure 7.5, adding training to universal preschool has the potential for moderately 
improving the short-term and medium-term economic development benefits of preschool. The original 
program had annual economic development benefits of about 15–23 percent of costs for the first 13 years 
or so after the program was initiated. With the add-on adult training, economic development benefits 
steadily increase during those first 13 years. For example, 10 years after the original program is initiated, 
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annual economic development benefits are only 15 percent of annual costs. With the add-on training, by 
10 years after program initiation, annual economic development benefits are 45 percent of annual costs, 
or three times as great. Annual economic development benefits of the original program did not exceed 
annual costs until 24 years after program start. With the training add-on, annual economic development 
benefits exceed costs after 19 years, five years earlier.20 
The potential for greater short-term ratios of benefits to costs is limited in a universal program 
because of the assumption that training benefits will be restricted to disadvantaged families. A more 
targeted preschool program would have its short-term benefits to cost ratio boosted more by adult training 
add-ons. Alternatively, a training program that had high returns to more advantaged workers could 
increase the short-term benefits to cost ratio. 
As Figure 7.6 shows, adding adult training to the Abecedarian program does not much affect the 
time pattern of the ratio of benefits to costs. The lack of effect reflects the large costs of the Abecedarian 
program. The modest earnings benefits provided by adult training do not loom large compared to the 
large costs per child participant in the Abecedarian program.21   
These potential effects of short-term training are hypothetical. It would seem important to do 
some demonstration projects and experimentation with adding training and employment services for 
adults to early childhood programs.  
It is particularly important to do such experimentation because there may be synergies between 
early childhood programs and adult training and employment programs. High-quality early childhood 
services may increase the return to adult training and employment programs by providing free child care 
and “peace of mind” to parents. Improved parental employment and earnings may increase the rate of 
return to early childhood programs. Higher family income may reduce stresses of poverty that harm child 
development and adult outcomes for those children. For example, research by Duncan et al. (2008) 
suggests that among families with less than $25,000 in annual income, increasing a family’s income by 
$1,000 per year increases the future earnings of children in that family by 6 percent.22 The calculations 
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here do not reflect these potential synergies, which may be important. It should be an important research 
priority to investigate the potential for programs that integrate services to children and their parents. 
CONCLUSION 
The economic development benefits from high-quality early childhood program are mostly long 
term. This is a problem for policymakers with short-time horizons. What can be done about this problem? 
Based on this chapter, a variety of solutions seem possible: 
• Do calculations demonstrating the likely cost savings in special education costs from early 
childhood programs. 
 
• Establish systems of regularly rating the scope, quality, and costs of state and local preschool 
programs in a comparable way. Promote these quality rating systems to potential property 
owners. Also, promote the importance of preschool to potential property owners. Such rating 
systems and promotion efforts would improve family awareness of the importance and quality of 
preschool. As a result, high-quality universal preschool programs would be more likely to 
increase property values in the short run.  
 
• Do demonstration projects and experiments that add adult employment and training programs to 
early childhood programs. See what works and what doesn’t work, and what potential synergies 
there are in combining such efforts.  
 
• If policymakers are reluctant to raise taxes to improve early childhood programs, urge 
policymakers to finance such programs with reductions in other government spending that has 
lower rates of return. 
 
• Once the current U.S. financial crisis has passed, explore options such as tax increment financing 
to fund expansion of high-quality early childhood programs.  
 
Of all these options, I believe an initiative to increase capitalization by increasing information on 
preschool programs is the most promising. This option directly addresses the central problem: 
policymakers undervalue the most important benefits of universal preschool, the future benefits for 
former child participants. If parents have sufficient information that these benefits for children are 
reflected in property valuations, then these future benefits become visible to policymakers in the short 
run. Furthermore, greater parent knowledge and valuation of preschool is also likely to affect how parents 
vote.  Such a change in voting behavior would certainly affect state policymakers. Finally, a sustained 
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effort to promote better information on preschool across states is relatively cheap compared to its 
potential benefits. 
This chapter has focused on the distribution of the benefits of early childhood programs over 
time. The next chapter focuses on the distribution of the benefits of early childhood programs and 
business incentive programs across different income groups. 
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NOTES 
 
1.  Savings and investment issues may complicate the discussion. Suppose the policy affects 
savings and investment flows. Suppose further that the social value of a dollar of savings or investment 
exceeds the social value of a dollar of consumption. Under these assumptions, we need to determine some 
shadow prices of savings and investment to adjust the different dollar flows to consumption equivalents.  
The financing of the policy’s costs may affect savings and investment in several ways. The 
financing may affect incomes, which will affect savings. Borrowing may affect interest rates. Extra taxes 
may affect the returns to savings and investment.  
But the benefits of the project may also affect savings and investment in several ways. Project 
benefits may also affect incomes. The project may also create a fiscal surplus. This may reduce 
borrowing’s burden on interest rates, or affect the need for taxes that distort the returns to savings and 
investment.  
The shadow price of savings and investment may exceed one due to tax wedges between the 
private before-tax return to investment and the private after-tax return to savings. In addition, the shadow 
price of savings and investment may exceed one due to the social return to investment exceeding the 
private before-tax return to investment. For example, if there are agglomeration economies, then 
investment may have external benefits for the economy.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, I avoid in this book taking account of these long-run dynamic effects 
of changes in savings and investment. I avoid these dynamic investment effects because I think there is no 
consensus among economists on the magnitude of such effects. Dynamic investment effects can lead to 
unbounded effects of policies under certain assumptions, but not under other also plausible assumptions. 
Dickens and his co-authors have models of early childhood programs that incorporate dynamic 
investment effects (Dickens et al. 2006, Dickens and Baschnagel 2007). 
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2.  Appendix 7A provides a more technical discussion. This includes an equation for the discount 
rate. It also includes discussing plausible values in that equation. 
3.  This compares the Abecedarian control group to the entire Abecedarian treatment group. 
Ramey et al. (2000) point out that the Abecedarian group that received preschool school services only, 
without extra K–2 support services, only had a special education services receipt rate of 12 percent. They 
argue that the extra K–2 services may have increased the recognition of special education service needs. 
However, the preschool-only group has a sample size of 23. Therefore, to be conservative, I decided to 
use the comparison between the overall Abecedarian treatment group and the control group to calculate 
the special ed. cost savings for the Abecedarian program.  
4.  The simulation was done in the following way: I assumed that the reduced special education 
percentage due to universal preschool would be 2.3 percent of all participants. This is 23 percent of the 
approximately 10 percent effect found in the Chicago Child Parent Center (CPC) program. This same 23 
percent factor was used to scale back the CPC effects for all earnings effects of the program, and reflects 
the assumption that a universal program will have somewhat smaller effects on more middle class 
children and on children already in preschool.  
For the Abecedarian program, I assumed that special ed. assignments would be reduced by 23 
percent of all participants. This 23 percent has nothing to do with the CPC scaleback factor. The 
Abecedarian 23 percent is based on experimental evaluations of the Abecedarian program that show a 
reduction in special ed. assignments from 48 percent in the control group to 25 percent in the treatment 
group.   
Increased special ed. costs were initially assumed to be $10,054 in 2007 dollars. This is based on 
Parrish et al. (2004, Part II) figures on special ed. costs for 1999–2000 of $8,080 (p. 22). These special ed. 
costs are updated to 2007 dollars using the CPI-U. I assume that only 10 percent of special education 
costs are paid by the federal government and 90 percent by state and local governments. This seems 
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consistent with the figures in Parrish et al. I only count as cost savings the state and local cost savings, as 
in this book I am focusing on the state perspective.   
It is assumed that the cost savings from reduced special education assignments accrue for all 13 
years from kindergarten through 12th grade. This implies that special education cost savings for a given 
cohort of early childhood participants begin accruing one year after the universal preschool program, and 
five years after the Abecedarian program begins for each cohort. For each cohort, it is assumed that 
special ed. costs after 2011 increase in real terms by 1.2 percent per year, which is this simulation model’s 
assumptions about average real wage increases. As in the regular simulation models, each subsequent 
cohort is assumed to be 0.3 percent bigger, as this is the population growth assumption of these models. 
In addition, each subsequent cohort is assumed to have 1.2 percent higher special education costs per 
students, to reflect wage growth. These assumptions about increasing real special ed. cost trends are 
modest, given that data from Parrish et al. suggest that special education costs have increased in real 
terms by 1.6 percent per year from 1977–1978 to 1999–2000. 
The simulations also allowed for reduced balanced budget multiplier effects from the reduced 
special education spending. This reduced economic development benefits. However, this reduction in 
benefits is less than the reduction in net costs. Reduced balanced budget multiplier effects were calculated 
the same way balanced budget multiplier effects were calculated for the original simulations. 
5.  Appendix 7B presents the numbers behind these figures.  
6.  This comes from the scenario in Krueger where the social discount rate is 3 percent and the 
annual productivity growth rate is 1 percent. I use the same social discount rate and a wage growth rate of 
1.2 percent. Under Krueger’s assumptions, the present value cost of this intervention per student is  
$7,660 in 1998 dollars, and the present value of future earnings benefits is $21,667 (Krueger 2003, Table 
5, p. F56). The resulting ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of costs is 2.83. 
7.  Krueger estimates that earnings will go up by 3.2 percent due to smaller class sizes. These 
smaller class sizes require a 47 percent increase (e.g., 22 over 15 = 1.47) in funding. This estimate 
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assumes that when class sizes are lower, all elements of per pupil spending must increase proportionately, 
not just the ratio of teachers to students. The average experimental student in the Tennessee class size 
study experienced these smaller class sizes for 2.3 years. If we divide 3.2 percent by the product of 47 
percent and 2.3 years, we get an earnings effect of 0.0296 percent for a 1 percent change in spending for 
one year of a student’s K–12 experience. 
8.  This is based on estimates originally made for implementing universal preschool in 2009 
(Bartik 2006). In 2007 dollars, this is estimated to have a net cost nationally of $17.9 billion. According 
to the Digest of Education Statistics, total public K–12 operating spending in the 2004–2005 school year 
was $424.6 billion. Updating to year 2007 prices yields a cost of $459.2 billion. According to projections 
from the Institute of Education Statistics, real education spending for public elementary and secondary 
schools is expected to increase by 32 percent from 2004–2005 to 2017–2018, which is an increase of 2.16 
percent per year. Applying this annual rate of increase, we get projected K–12 spending for the 2009–
2010 school year of $510.9 billion. Preschool spending of $17.9 billion divided by $510.9 billion is 3.5 
percent. 
9.  The actual simulation calculation is slightly more complicated. Because I am focusing on state 
residents and state earnings, I adjust these impacts down slightly to account for in or out-migration during 
the K–12 school years. Therefore, of students leaving the K–12 school system at age 18, not everyone 
will have experienced their entire K–12 education in the state that is reducing its K–12 spending by 3.5 
percent. This consideration lowers the average effect on earnings after 13 years from 1.35 percent to 1.20 
percent. 
10.  I also have to make assumptions about how many public school students will annual exit the 
public school system via graduating or dropping out. For graduates, I start with public school graduates 
for 2005–2006 from the Digest of Education Statistics. For dropouts, I use Heckman’s figure that the true 
four-year graduation rate is 77 percent (Heckman and LaFontaine 2008).  (Reported high school dropout 
rates are probably too low.) I calculate from this figure an annual dropout rate. I apply this dropout rate to 
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total public high school enrollment in the fall of 2005 to get the number of dropouts exiting the high 
schools at that time. These 2005–2006 figures for annual numbers of both graduates and dropouts are 
adjusted to 2009 by using projections that public school graduates will grow at 0.59 percent per year 
(Projections of Education Statistics report by Hussar and Bailey 2008). These 2009 figures are 
compatible with the 2009 starting date for the original preschool projections. For 2011 starting numbers, I 
assume that all effects are the same percentage of total earnings. 
11.  The long-run positive effects of universal preschool are a 1.40 percent boost to earnings. The 
long-run negative effects of reduced K–12 spending in this scenario are −0.55 percent. The ratio of this 
negative effect to the positive effect is 0.39. 
12.  In the model of this developed by Roback (1982), and used by many subsequent researchers, 
increased household amenities at the interstate or intermetropolitan level could also in theory be reflected 
in lower wages. However, as pointed out in Bartik and Smith (1987), for an increase in an amenity that is 
just valued by households, and not businesses, the percentage increase in property values should be much 
greater than the percentage reduction in wages. Labor is a much larger share of business costs than land, 
and therefore only very small reductions in wages are compatible with keeping profits the same after an 
increase in land prices. Furthermore, it could be argued that business will also place some direct value on 
the “amenity” of better early childhood programs. Any direct benefit to businesses from this amenity will 
further drive up both property values and wages. 
13.  These remarks are somewhat speculative. We really don’t know the true incidence of many 
tax and spending programs at the state and local level. Economists seem to believe that higher property 
taxes will be capitalized into lower property values. There is less agreement about what will happen due 
to other changes in state and local taxes and spending. The text passage suggests that the incidence may 
depend in part on how many households mentally classify a particular tax or service as being tied to 
property ownership. Property taxes are clearly tied to property ownership. By longstanding tradition, the 
quality of public education is also tied to where a household lives, and so is mentally considered to be part 
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of the property purchase. The question is whether households think of early childhood programs as being 
tied to property ownership. The issue that this section of the chapter explores is whether such a 
connection either naturally is made (through effects of early childhood programs on school test scores) or 
can be made through the right marketing of preschool. 
14.  This is based upon estimates from the Chicago Child Parent Center program that the program 
increased participant average test scores in 3rd , 4th, and 5th grades by an average effect size of 0.22 
(Reynolds 1995).  I assume, as was done in the simulation, that the effects of a universal preschool 
program will be only 23 percent of the effects of a program such as CPC that is targeted. On the other 
hand, peer effects will multiply effects by 1.54 times the raw effects. Therefore, the effects on average 
test scores are 0.08 = 0.22 × 0.23 × 1.54.  
15.  This statement principally relies on studies by Black (1999), Bayer et al. (2007), and Kane et 
al. (2006). Black found that an increase of one standard deviation in across-school average test scores 
increased property values by 2.2 percent. Based on studies of test score variation by Bloom (2006) and 
Kane et al., a one standard deviation difference in cross student test scores is probably between 2 and 5 
times the standard deviation in cross-school test scores. So Black’s numbers imply that a change in 
average test scores of one standard deviation in student test scores will increase property values by 4 
percent to 11 percent.  Bayer et al. find that an increase in average school test scores of one standard 
deviation in across-school average test scores increased property values by 1.8 percent. Multiplying by 2 
to 5 yields an effect of an increase in average test scores of one standard deviation in cross-student test 
scores of 4 percent to 9 percent. However, Bayer et al. also find effects that are perhaps twice as great if 
one allows for test scores to change the demographic composition of school neighborhoods. It could be 
argued that the long-run effect of school test score changes should include such adjustments, which would 
raise the test score effects on property values to 8 to 18 percent. Finally, Kane et al. concluded that an 
increase in average school test scores of one student deviation across students increased property values 
by about 10 percent.  Therefore, a range of a 5 to 10 percent effect seems reasonable. 
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16.  This is based on figures from the Federal Reserve Board’s (2009) Flow of Funds report that 
residential property values in the United States as of the fourth quarter of 2008 were 23.1 trillion dollars. 
(This sums the residential real estate values of the household sector and the noncorporate sector.) 
Multiplying this by the percentage effects on property values, and converting to 2007 dollars, and 
comparing to the estimated national cost of universal preschool in 2007 dollars of $17.9 billion, I get the 
ratio cited in the text.  
17.  This uses figures from the Tax Policy Center that typical property tax rates in the United 
States are 1.33 percent of property value (Yilmaz et al. 2006). 
18.  I take the total flow of earnings in the state due to universal preschool, including effects on 
parents, children, and spending effects. These effects are calculated including displacement effects. I then 
add in the flow of earnings for former child participants who leave the state. For these leavers, I do not 
adjust for displacement. The assumption is that prospective property buyers in the state will consider the 
net effect on their earnings if they stay in the state, which will include displacement effects, and also 
consider the net effect on their earnings if they leave the state, which will not include displacement effects 
because the state is assumed to be small relative to the nation. 
19.  This is not how GAO spun the results. GAO emphasized that results became statistically 
insignificant some years after training. However, the results also indicated that results did not statistically 
significantly change over time. In any job training experiment, one would expect training effect estimates 
to become more imprecise with time. With more time since training, there are more random shocks to 
earnings that increase imprecision. 
20.  The ratio of the present value of benefits to costs improves from 2.78 to 3.31. 
21.  The ratio of the present value of economic development benefits to the present value of 
program costs increases from 2.25 to 2.37. 
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22.  This calculation uses the regression coefficients from Appendix Table 3 in Duncan et al. 
(2008). I use the coefficient of 0.584 in predicting ln(earnings) using income measured in $10,000 units, 
and then translate this effect on ln(earnings) into an actual percentage effect. 
Figure 7.1  Ratio of Annual Program Effects on State Residents’ Earnings to Program Costs, Each Year after Permanent Program Is 
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NOTE:  This figure assumes that one of four early childhood programs is begun in 2011, and continued permanently.  The figure reports effects on state residents’ 
earnings due to increases in the earnings of the state's original residents who remain in the state.  For comparison, the figure also shows effects for permanent 
program of business incentives whose scale remains at same percentage of the state economy over time.  This figure is identical to Figure 4.2.
Figure 7.2  Annual Flow of Economic Development Benefits vs. Net Program Costs, after Adjusting for Reduced Special Education 
Costs, Universal Preschool 
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NOTE:  Program is assumed to start full-scale in 2011 and continue indefinitely.  Assumptions used are described in text and text endnotes.  Appendix 7B shows 
the numbers behind this figure. 
Figure 7.3  Annual Flow of Economic Development Benefits vs. Net Program Costs, after Adjusting for Reduced Special Education 
Costs, Abecedarian Program 
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NOTE:  Program is assumed to start full-scale in 2011 and continue indefinitely.  Assumptions used are described in text and text endnotes.  Appendix 7B shows 
the numbers behind this figure. 
Figure 7.4  Effects on State Economic Development of Financing Universal Preschool through Reducing K–12 Spending 
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NOTE:  Effects for universal preschool are as previously described in Chapter 4, and in Bartik (2006).  Effects of cutting K–12 are modeled as described in chapter 
text, and follow estimates of Krueger (2003).  The net effect is simply the difference between the two. 
Figure 7.5  Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to Program Costs, Universal Preschool, with Adult Training 
Component, Compared to Similar Ratio without a Training Component 
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NOTE:  Methodology is explained in chapter text and appendix.  Economic development benefits are increases in earnings of state residents. 
Figure 7.6  Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to Program Costs, Abecedarian Program, with Adult Training 
Component, Compared to Similar Ratio without a Training Component 
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NOTE:  Methodology is explained in chapter text and appendix.  Economic development benefits are increases in earnings of state residents.
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Table 7.1  Effects of Alternative Discount Rate Assumptions on Ratio of Present Value of 
Program Earnings Effects to Costs, Business Incentives, and Four Early Childhood 
Programs, State Perspective 
Discount rate assumption of book  
Stern Moore et al. This book Nordhaus Weitzman 
Implied discount rate on aggregate 
future earnings (%) 
1.6 2.2 3.0 3.9 4.4 
      
Ratio of present value of earnings effects to costs for:    
Business incentives 4.01 3.60 3.14 2.72 2.52 
Universal preschool 4.46 3.62 2.78 2.10 1.82 
Abecedarian 1.59 2.54 2.25 1.88 1.71 
Nurse Family Partnership 1.88 2.23 1.85 1.49 1.33 
Parent-Child Home Program 6.29 7.31 5.66 4.17 3.53 
NOTE: See Appendix 7A for methodology and references. All ratios here are from state perspective. 
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Table 7.2  Annual Rate of Return to Business Incentives and Four Early Childhood Programs, 
From a State Perspective 
Program 
Annual rate of return,  
state perspective 
Business incentives 12.6 
Universal preschool 6.7 
Abecedarian 7.7 
Nurse Family Partnership 5.7 
Parent-Child Home Program 8.6 
NOTE: This table shows the highest real interest rate at which the present value of earnings effects of the program 
exceeds the present value of program costs.   
 Table 7.3  Possible Capitalization Effects of Universal Preschool  
Discount rate used 3% 4.7% 6.06% 7.33% 
Elementary test score 
effect for comparison 
Basis Optimal social 
discount rate 
Parental discount rate 
for investment in 
children, inferred 
from investment 
choices regarding 
children’s health 
Discount rate compatible 
with estimate that one 
standard deviation 
increase in test scores 
increases property values 
by 10% 
Average 30-ear real 
mortgage rate from 
Barrow and Rouse.  
(Also compatible with one 
standard deviation test 
score effect of about 5%) 
Possible effects from 
effects of elementary 
test scores on property 
value, and effect of 
universal preschool on 
elementary test scores 
Gross capitalization of economic development benefits    
% effect on property values 22.9 6.4 3.1 1.8 0.4–0.8 
Ratio of property value effect to annual 
costs of universal preschool 
290.8 80.9 39.3 22.6 5.1 to 10.2 
Property taxes raised as proportion of 
annual costs of universal preschool 
3.87 1.08 0.52 0.30 0.07 to 0.14 
Subtracting out full program costs    
% effect on property values 17.5 4.5 1.2 0.3  
Ratio of property value effect to annual 
costs of universal preschool 
222.1 57.3 15.6 4.2  
Property taxes raised as proportion of 
annual costs of universal preschool 
2.95 0.76 0.21 0.06  
NOTES: The figures in the last column come from the previous section of the text, which analyzed capitalization effects expected due to universal preschool’s effects on elementary 
test scores. The remaining columns calculate capitalization under various assumptions about discount rates and whether all of program costs are deemed relevant to property 
valuation. The first three rows of numbers simply consider capitalization under the assumption that only gross economic development benefits of universal preschool are 
capitalized. Fiscal effects are ignored under the assumption that these are not relevant, either because of many fiscal benefits (e.g., reduced special ed. costs, criminal justice system 
costs, welfare costs, child welfare costs) as well as costs of universal preschool, or because the marginal homebuyer may not pay much of those costs (e.g., fiscal costs may not be 
deemed relevant to property bids if financed by sales tax, or progressive income tax, or business tax). The final three rows of numbers consider the opposite extreme example: all 
of the program costs of universal preschool are capitalized, ignoring any fiscal benefits of universal preschool. Capitalization effects on property values calculate the discounted 
present value of economic development benefits (or economic development benefits minus program costs) under various discount rates, and gets percentage effect by dividing by 
estimated total residential property values, which are estimated based on data from Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds data (Federal Reserve, March 2009). Property tax 
collections assume a real property tax rate of 1.33%, based on average national data from Yilmaz et al. (2006) of the Tax Policy Center. The discount rate assumptions are based on 
different plausible discount rates. 3% is the optimal social discount rate used in this book. 4.7% is an estimate of the average discount rate used by parents for making decisions 
about investments in their child’s health. 6.06% is an estimate of the discount rate that would be needed to explain how elementary test scores affect housing prices, assuming a 
one standard deviation increase in test scores increases housing prices by 10%. 7.33% is an estimate from Barrow and Rouse of the average real 30-year mortgage rate. 7.33% is 
also close to the discount rate needed to explain how elementary test scores affects housing prices, under the assumption that a one standard deviation increase in test scores 
increases housing prices by 5%. (The actual discount rate for a 5% effect is 7.5%.)  
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APPENDIX 7A 
MORE ON DISCOUNTING 
This book’s baseline estimates assume a real social discount rate of 3 percent. Is this the 
appropriate rate? What alternatives might be considered?  
The most commonly used equation for deriving appropriate discount rates for discounting 
future flows of consumption is the well-known Ramsey equation: 
r = d + ge 
where r is the social discount rate, g is the assumed annual growth rate of per capita consumption, 
e is the elasticity of personal utility with respect to per capita consumption, and d is the assumed 
annual discount rate for future utility (sometimes called the pure rate of time preference). The 
basic idea is that we should discount the future more heavily either because we have an inherent 
preference for the present over the future, or because the future will be wealthier, and a dollar of 
real per capita consumption to the richer future should be valued as having a lower social value 
than a dollar of real per capita consumption in the poorer present.1  
Whatever we assume about the parameters d (the rate of pure time preference) and e (the 
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to per capita consumption), we must choose g to be 
consistent with the model used in this report. This report assumes that real wages will increase by 
1.2 percent per year. It is the difference between this assumed growth rate of wages and the social 
discount rate that mainly affects the present value calculations. It would be inconsistent to use a 
social discount rate that used rates of growth of per capita consumption other than 1.2 percent 
without also altering the rate of wage growth assumed in the model’s calculations.2 
There are a variety of perspectives for appropriate values of d and e. The Stern Review 
(2007) assumes values for d of 0.1 and for e of 1. The low value of d rests on the notion that there 
is no reason that increases in utility in the future should be valued differently from increases in 
7A-2 
utility today. The value of e of 1 corresponds to assuming that a given percentage change in per 
capita consumption has the same effect on utility for all persons at all times. The Stern report 
therefore implies a social discount rate for future consumption of 1.3 percent. 
A recent prominent report in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management by Moore 
et al. (2004) advocates a value for d of 1 and for e of 1. This yields an implied discount rate for 
future consumption of 2.2 percent. 
Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007) advocate for assumptions about the parameters d 
and e that yield real discount rates that are closer to real rates of return on investment that we 
observe in the market. Nordhaus assumes a value for d of 1.5 and for e of 2, which yields a 
discount rate on future consumption of 3.9 percent. Weitzman assumes a value for d of 2.0 and 
for e of 2, yielding a discount rate on future consumption of 4.4 percent. 
These seem to encompass the plausible range of rates for discounting future consumption 
under the assumptions about wage growth used here. Higher rates of annual wage growth could 
yield higher discount rates. But then future earnings would also be higher.  
The rates implied by the Stern Review, the Moore et al. paper, the 3 percent figure of the 
current book, Nordhaus and Weitzman, are used in the table in the text. One exception is that the 
Stern discount rate of 1.3 percent is adjusted upward to 1.6 percent. The discount rate of 1.3 
percent causes present values to blow up to infinity, as the sum of 1.2 percent wage growth plus 
assumed population growth of 0.3 percent yields a rate of aggregate earnings growth of over 1.5 
percent. A rate of 1.6 percent avoids these infinities.  
7A-3 
NOTES 
 
1.  This is the appropriate risk-free discount rate, but models of the appropriate discount 
rate do not show that a large amount should be added for risk (Weitzman 2007). Furthermore, 
even if we assume that a large amount should be added for risk, based on the discrepancy 
between real interest rates on government bonds and rates of return to equities, if program 
benefits are only moderately correlated with per capita consumption, the rate of discount for 
benefits that are 30 or 40 years in the future, when the bulk of the benefits from early childhood 
programs occur, will be closer to risk-free rates than to rates incorporating risk (see Weitzman 
2007, pp. 711–712). 
2.  For example, one could argue for using a rate of per capita consumption growth equal 
to 1.6 percent per year, as that is the rate of per capita GDP growth used in this report and my 
previous reports. However, if we are going to use that rate of per capita consumption growth to 
generate a discount rate, we probably should focus on total labor compensation rather than only 
straight earnings. It seems likely that the labor share of GDP will not significantly decline, which 
implies that overall labor compensation will grows at 1.6 percent per year, even though the 
earnings growth figure is only projected to grow at 1.2 percent per year. 
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APPENDIX 7B 
EFFECTS OF REDUCED SPECIAL EDUCATION COSTS ON BENEFITS VS. COSTS OF 
UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL AND THE ABECEDARIAN PROGRAM 
This appendix presents the numbers behind Figures 7.2 and 7.3 in the text. The assumptions and 
methods used to generate these numbers are presented in the text and endnotes to the text. Table 7B.1 
presents the numbers behind Figure 7.2. Table 7B.2 presents the numbers behind Figure 7.3. Each table 
compares the ratio of economic development benefits to net costs associated with early childhood 
programs, for each year after a permanent program is enacted in 2011. One column shows the ratio when 
special education cost savings are not considered. The other column shows the ratio when special 
education cost savings are considered. Table 7B.1 and Figure 7.2 consider universal preschool. Table 
7B.2 and Figure 7.3 consider the Abecedarian program. 
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Table 7B.1  Ratio of Annual Economic Development Benefits to Net Program Costs, Universal 
Preschool, with and without Allowing for Special Education Cost Savings 
Year Universal preschool without adjustments 
Ratio of universal preschool earnings to net costs
(special ed. cost savings included) 
2011 0.225 0.225 
2012 0.213 0.215 
2013 0.201 0.204 
2014 0.189 0.192 
2015 0.176 0.179 
2016 0.163 0.165 
2017 0.161 0.166 
2018 0.160 0.167 
2019 0.159 0.167 
2020 0.157 0.167 
2021 0.155 0.166 
2022 0.152 0.166 
2023 0.170 0.196 
2024 0.199 0.249 
2025 0.240 0.318 
2026 0.305 0.427 
2027 0.376 0.544 
2028 0.450 0.667 
2029 0.529 0.797 
2030 0.612 0.933 
2031 0.697 1.072 
2032 0.785 1.216 
2033 0.876 1.365 
2034 0.959 1.503 
2035 1.048 1.648 
2036 1.137 1.795 
2037 1.229 1.945 
2038 1.321 2.096 
2039 1.420 2.259 
2040 1.518 2.419 
2041 1.620 2.586 
2042 1.724 2.757 
2043 1.829 2.928 
2044 1.940 3.110 
2045 2.051 3.293 
2046 2.165 3.480 
2047 2.278 3.664 
2048 2.393 3.853 
2049 2.513 4.048 
2050 2.628 4.237 
Table 7B.1  (Continued) 
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Year Universal preschool without adjustments 
Ratio of universal preschool earnings to net costs
(special ed. cost savings included) 
2051 2.746 4.429 
2052 2.863 4.621 
2053 2.974 4.803 
2054 3.090 4.993 
2055 3.202 5.175 
2056 3.311 5.353 
2057 3.421 5.533 
2058 3.529 5.709 
2059 3.634 5.881 
2060 3.736 6.048 
2061 3.832 6.205 
2062 3.919 6.346 
2063 4.008 6.491 
2064 4.089 6.623 
2065 4.168 6.752 
2066 4.241 6.871 
2067 4.306 6.977 
2068 4.363 7.070 
2069 4.416 7.157 
2070 4.461 7.230 
2071 4.503 7.298 
2072 4.532 7.345 
2073 4.556 7.385 
2074 4.576 7.418 
2075 4.597 7.451 
2076 4.612 7.476 
2077 4.626 7.499 
2078 4.637 7.517 
2079 4.646 7.532 
2080 4.654 7.544 
2081 4.659 7.553 
2082 4.663 7.559 
2083 4.667 7.566 
2084 4.671 7.571 
2085 4.673 7.576 
2086 4.675 7.579 
2087 4.677 7.582 
2088 4.679 7.585 
2089 4.681 7.588 
2090 4.682 7.591 
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Table 7B.2  Ratio of Annual Economic Development Benefits to Net Program Costs, Abecedarian 
Program, with and without Allowing for Special Education Cost Savings 
Year 
Ratio of benefits to gross costs 
(no special education cost savings) 
Ratio of benefits to net costs 
(special education cost savings included) 
2011 0.307 0.307 
2012 0.307 0.307 
2013 0.308 0.308 
2014 0.310 0.310 
2015 0.314 0.314 
2016 0.324 0.329 
2017 0.341 0.351 
2018 0.365 0.383 
2019 0.396 0.425 
2020 0.432 0.477 
2021 0.472 0.536 
2022 0.514 0.601 
2023 0.557 0.673 
2024 0.602 0.751 
2025 0.648 0.836 
2026 0.695 0.929 
2027 0.742 1.028 
2028 0.790 1.138 
2029 0.839 1.216 
2030 0.910 1.327 
2031 0.984 1.442 
2032 1.062 1.564 
2033 1.141 1.686 
2034 1.224 1.814 
2035 1.305 1.939 
2036 1.384 2.060 
2037 1.460 2.177 
2038 1.534 2.291 
2039 1.607 2.404 
2040 1.681 2.519 
2041 1.755 2.634 
2042 1.830 2.748 
2043 1.903 2.862 
2044 1.977 2.976 
2045 2.049 3.088 
2046 2.120 3.198 
2047 2.191 3.307 
2048 2.260 3.414 
2049 2.329 3.522 
2050 2.398 3.627 
2051 2.466 3.733 
Table 7B.2 (Continued) 
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Year 
Ratio of benefits to gross costs 
(no special education cost savings) 
Ratio of benefits to net costs 
(special education cost savings included) 
2052 2.533 3.837 
2053 2.599 3.939 
2054 2.663 4.039 
2055 2.725 4.135 
2056 2.785 4.227 
2057 2.843 4.316 
2058 2.897 4.400 
2059 2.949 4.481 
2060 2.999 4.558 
2061 3.047 4.632 
2062 3.090 4.700 
2063 3.132 4.764 
2064 3.170 4.823 
2065 3.205 4.877 
2066 3.236 4.925 
2067 3.263 4.968 
2068 3.288 5.006 
2069 3.311 5.042 
2070 3.331 5.072 
2071 3.347 5.098 
2072 3.361 5.120 
2073 3.374 5.140 
2074 3.385 5.156 
2075 3.394 5.170 
2076 3.401 5.181 
2077 3.406 5.190 
2078 3.411 5.197 
2079 3.414 5.201 
2080 3.416 5.204 
2081 3.416 5.205 
2082 3.416 5.205 
2083 3.415 5.204 
2084 3.414 5.202 
2085 3.412 5.199 
2086 3.409 5.195 
2087 3.406 5.190 
2088 3.403 5.185 
2089 3.399 5.180 
2090 3.395 5.174 
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APPENDIX 7C 
FURTHER RESULTS OF SIMULATIONS OF FINANCING UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL BY 
REALLOCATING FUNDS FROM K-12 EDUCATION 
This appendix provides some additional numbers for the effects of financing universal preschool 
by reducing K–12 spending. 
I consider three simulations. Simulation 1, described in the chapter text and the endnotes to the 
chapter, assumes that the effects on student achievement and subsequent earnings of reduced K–12 
spending are the same per dollar as those estimated by Krueger (2003). 
The other two simulations arbitrarily assume other scenarios. I assume that the productivity 
effects of lowering K–12 spending are one-half of those estimated by Krueger, and one-quarter. 
Table 7C.1 shows the results of these simulations. The universal preschool program and K–12 
spending reduction are enacted in 2011 and continue indefinitely. Effects are shown on state residents’ 
earnings as a percentage of total state earnings. 
Figure 7C.1 compares the three simulations. The comparison only shows the net benefits. As one 
would expect, this hypothetical budget reallocation has greater effects as K–12 spending reductions are 
assumed to be less consequential for student learning and subsequent earnings.  
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Table 7C.1  Effects on State Economic Development of Financing Universal Preschool Through 
Reducing K–12 Spending, Various Scenarios 
Full Krueger effects Half Krueger effects One-quarter Krueger effects
Year 
Universal 
preschool 
effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
2011 0.067 -0.052 0.016 -0.052 0.016 -0.052 0.016 
2012 0.064 -0.048 0.016 -0.048 0.016 -0.048 0.016 
2013 0.060 -0.045 0.015 -0.045 0.015 -0.045 0.016 
2014 0.056 -0.042 0.014 -0.041 0.015 -0.041 0.015 
2015 0.053 -0.040 0.013 -0.038 0.014 -0.038 0.015 
2016 0.049 -0.038 0.011 -0.035 0.013 -0.034 0.015 
2017 0.048 -0.040 0.009 -0.036 0.012 -0.034 0.014 
2018 0.048 -0.043 0.005 -0.037 0.011 -0.035 0.013 
2019 0.047 -0.046 0.001 -0.039 0.008 -0.035 0.012 
2020 0.047 -0.050 -0.004 -0.041 0.006 -0.036 0.011 
2021 0.046 -0.056 -0.009 -0.043 0.003 -0.037 0.009 
2022 0.046 -0.062 -0.016 -0.046 0.000 -0.038 0.008 
2023 0.051 -0.068 -0.018 -0.049 0.002 -0.039 0.012 
2024 0.060 -0.076 -0.017 -0.052 0.007 -0.040 0.019 
2025 0.072 -0.085 -0.013 -0.056 0.015 -0.042 0.030 
2026 0.091 -0.094 -0.003 -0.060 0.031 -0.044 0.048 
2027 0.112 -0.104 0.008 -0.065 0.047 -0.046 0.067 
2028 0.135 -0.115 0.020 -0.070 0.065 -0.048 0.087 
2029 0.158 -0.126 0.032 -0.075 0.083 -0.050 0.108 
2030 0.183 -0.137 0.045 -0.081 0.102 -0.052 0.131 
2031 0.208 -0.150 0.059 -0.086 0.122 -0.054 0.154 
2032 0.235 -0.162 0.073 -0.092 0.143 -0.057 0.178 
2033 0.262 -0.175 0.087 -0.098 0.164 -0.059 0.202 
2034 0.287 -0.188 0.099 -0.104 0.183 -0.062 0.225 
2035 0.313 -0.201 0.113 -0.110 0.203 -0.065 0.249 
2036 0.340 -0.214 0.126 -0.116 0.224 -0.067 0.273 
2037 0.367 -0.227 0.140 -0.122 0.245 -0.070 0.297 
2038 0.395 -0.241 0.154 -0.129 0.266 -0.073 0.322 
2039 0.425 -0.255 0.170 -0.135 0.289 -0.076 0.349 
2040 0.454 -0.268 0.186 -0.142 0.312 -0.078 0.375 
2041 0.484 -0.282 0.203 -0.148 0.336 -0.081 0.403 
2042 0.515 -0.295 0.220 -0.154 0.361 -0.084 0.431 
2043 0.547 -0.309 0.238 -0.161 0.386 -0.087 0.460 
2044 0.580 -0.322 0.258 -0.167 0.413 -0.090 0.490 
2045 0.613 -0.336 0.278 -0.173 0.440 -0.092 0.521 
2046 0.647 -0.349 0.299 -0.180 0.468 -0.095 0.552 
2047 0.681 -0.362 0.319 -0.186 0.495 -0.098 0.583 
2048 0.716 -0.375 0.341 -0.192 0.524 -0.101 0.615 
2049 0.751 -0.387 0.364 -0.198 0.553 -0.103 0.648 
2050 0.786 -0.400 0.386 -0.204 0.582 -0.106 0.680 
2051 0.821 -0.412 0.409 -0.210 0.611 -0.109 0.712 
2052 0.856 -0.424 0.432 -0.215 0.641 -0.111 0.745 
2053 0.889 -0.435 0.454 -0.221 0.669 -0.114 0.776 
2054 0.924 -0.446 0.478 -0.226 0.698 -0.116 0.808 
2055 0.957 -0.457 0.500 -0.231 0.726 -0.118 0.839 
2056 0.990 -0.467 0.523 -0.236 0.754 -0.120 0.869 
Table 7C.1  (Continued) 
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Full Krueger effects Half Krueger effects One-quarter Krueger effects
Year 
Universal 
preschool 
effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
Reduced  
K–12 $ effects Net effects 
2057 1.023 -0.477 0.546 -0.241 0.782 -0.123 0.900 
2058 1.055 -0.485 0.570 -0.245 0.810 -0.125 0.931 
2059 1.087 -0.494 0.593 -0.249 0.838 -0.126 0.960 
2060 1.117 -0.501 0.616 -0.253 0.865 -0.128 0.989 
2061 1.146 -0.508 0.638 -0.256 0.890 -0.130 1.016 
2062 1.172 -0.514 0.658 -0.259 0.913 -0.131 1.041 
2063 1.198 -0.520 0.678 -0.262 0.937 -0.132 1.066 
2064 1.223 -0.525 0.698 -0.264 0.959 -0.134 1.089 
2065 1.246 -0.529 0.717 -0.266 0.980 -0.135 1.112 
2066 1.268 -0.532 0.736 -0.268 1.000 -0.135 1.133 
2067 1.287 -0.535 0.752 -0.269 1.018 -0.136 1.151 
2068 1.305 -0.538 0.767 -0.270 1.034 -0.137 1.168 
2069 1.320 -0.540 0.781 -0.271 1.049 -0.137 1.183 
2070 1.334 -0.542 0.792 -0.272 1.062 -0.138 1.196 
2071 1.346 -0.543 0.803 -0.273 1.073 -0.138 1.209 
2072 1.355 -0.544 0.811 -0.274 1.081 -0.138 1.217 
2073 1.362 -0.545 0.817 -0.274 1.088 -0.138 1.224 
2074 1.368 -0.546 0.822 -0.274 1.094 -0.139 1.230 
2075 1.374 -0.547 0.828 -0.275 1.100 -0.139 1.236 
2076 1.379 -0.547 0.832 -0.275 1.104 -0.139 1.240 
2077 1.383 -0.548 0.836 -0.275 1.108 -0.139 1.244 
2078 1.387 -0.548 0.838 -0.275 1.111 -0.139 1.247 
2079 1.389 -0.548 0.841 -0.276 1.114 -0.139 1.250 
2080 1.391 -0.549 0.843 -0.276 1.116 -0.139 1.252 
2081 1.393 -0.549 0.844 -0.276 1.117 -0.139 1.254 
2082 1.394 -0.549 0.845 -0.276 1.118 -0.139 1.255 
2083 1.395 -0.549 0.846 -0.276 1.120 -0.139 1.256 
2084 1.397 -0.549 0.847 -0.276 1.121 -0.139 1.257 
2085 1.397 -0.549 0.848 -0.276 1.121 -0.139 1.258 
2086 1.398 -0.549 0.849 -0.276 1.122 -0.139 1.259 
2087 1.400 -0.546 0.854 -0.273 1.127 -0.137 1.263 
2088 1.400 -0.546 0.854 -0.273 1.127 -0.137 1.263 
2089 1.400 -0.546 0.854 -0.273 1.127 -0.137 1.263 
2090 1.400 -0.546 0.854 -0.273 1.127 -0.137 1.263 
NOTE:  Estimated universal preschool effects are as described in Chapter 4 and Bartik (2006).  The “full Krueger 
effects” are as described in Chapter 7.  Net effects simply sum the preschool plus reduced K–12 spending effects.  
These three columns are the basis for Figure 7.4.  The remaining two scenarios scale the Krueger estimates back.  
The net effects under these three scenarios are used to generate Figure 7C.1. 
  
Figure 7C.1  Effects on State Economic Development of Financing Universal Preschool through Reducing K–12 Spending, Three 
Scenarios for Effects of K–12 Spending 
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NOTE:  Effects of cutting K–12 spending are modeled as described in chapter text, and follow estimates of Krueger (2003).  The only difference in the simulations 
is whether to use full Krueger effects, or to scale those effects back by one-half or three-quarters. 
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APPENDIX 7D 
This appendix presents some of the numbers behind Figures 7.5 and 7.6. The calculation of these 
numbers is explained in the text. 
Adding in a job training component affects these calculations of economic development benefits 
and costs in three ways. First, it adds in earnings effects on parents. Second, it adds in some extra 
budgetary costs of the programs. Third, that extra spending adds in some balanced budget multiplier 
effects. 
As explained in the text, the earnings effects on parents are assumed to be the same for parents as 
was achieved for adult women in the JTPA experiment. Costs per trainee are also assumed to be the same 
as for adult women in the JTPA experiment.  I had to make some assumptions about how persistent these 
earnings effects would be. I also had to assume when these earnings effects would begin. I assumed that 
earnings effects begin at age 20, and persist the same in real terms until age 50. It should be noted that 
keeping earnings effects the same in real terms implies a smaller percentage effect as earnings grow over 
the early part of the life cycle. Persistent earnings effects are consistent with postprogram evidence from 
the GAO (1996). After age 50, I assumed earnings effects declined similar to what was assumed in the 
Abecedarian program’s baseline calculations for the effects of the original program on adult women. 
These declining earnings effects reflected the decline in control group earnings as individuals age, which 
is accompanied by lower employment rates and lower real wage rates.  
As with the original calculations, all estimates adjust for death rates at different ages and for the 
proportion of the adults likely to stay in the same state. Estimates also assume that one-third of this supply 
shock results in displacement, so estimated effects are scaled back by one-third.  
Finally, estimates had to assume something about how many adults will participate in this 
program. As the Abecedarian program targets a disadvantaged group, I assumed that 75 percent of 
Abecedarian families would have adults participating in job training. But universal preschool includes 
many middle- and upper-class families that are less likely to participate in these training efforts, at least 
7D-2 
training efforts similar to JTPA. I assumed 75 percent participation in training of the high-risk group of 
families, 25 percent participation of the medium-risk group of families, and zero participation of the low 
risk group of families. The proportions for the different risk groups are derived from Karoly et al., and are 
reproduced and discussed in Bartik (2006).  
Table 7D.1 shows the estimated effects for universal preschool with an add-on training program. 
Table 7D.2 show similar estimates for the Abecedarian program. These tables are the numbers behind 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6.  
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Table 7D.1  Ratio of Annual Economic Development Benefits to Costs, Universal Preschool Program, 
with and without Adult Training Component 
Year 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
with adult training 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
without adult training 
2011 0.221 0.225 
2012 0.242 0.213 
2013 0.262 0.201 
2014 0.281 0.189 
2015 0.299 0.176 
2016 0.316 0.163 
2017 0.344 0.161 
2018 0.371 0.160 
2019 0.397 0.159 
2020 0.422 0.157 
2021 0.445 0.154 
2022 0.468 0.152 
2023 0.509 0.170 
2024 0.560 0.199 
2025 0.621 0.240 
2026 0.704 0.305 
2027 0.791 0.376 
2028 0.881 0.450 
2029 0.976 0.529 
2030 1.073 0.612 
2031 1.172 0.697 
2032 1.273 0.785 
2033 1.377 0.876 
2034 1.473 0.959 
2035 1.573 1.048 
2036 1.673 1.137 
2037 1.774 1.229 
2038 1.876 1.321 
2039 1.983 1.420 
2040 2.088 1.518 
2041 2.197 1.620 
2042 2.307 1.724 
2043 2.418 1.829 
2044 2.533 1.940 
2045 2.648 2.051 
2046 2.765 2.165 
2047 2.879 2.278 
2048 2.996 2.393 
2049 3.115 2.513 
2050 3.230 2.628 
2051 3.346 2.746 
2052 3.462 2.863 
2053 3.572 2.974 
2054 3.685 3.090 
Table 7D.1  (Continued) 
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Year 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
with adult training 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
without adult training 
2055 3.794 3.202 
2056 3.899 3.311 
2057 4.006 3.421 
2058 4.109 3.529 
2059 4.210 3.634 
2060 4.308 3.736 
2061 4.399 3.832 
2062 4.481 3.919 
2063 4.565 4.008 
2064 4.642 4.089 
2065 4.716 4.168 
2066 4.784 4.241 
2067 4.845 4.306 
2068 4.899 4.363 
2069 4.949 4.416 
2070 4.990 4.461 
2071 5.029 4.503 
2072 5.056 4.532 
2073 5.078 4.556 
2074 5.097 4.576 
2075 5.116 4.597 
2076 5.130 4.612 
2077 5.143 4.626 
2078 5.153 4.637 
2079 5.161 4.646 
2080 5.168 4.654 
2081 5.173 4.659 
2082 5.177 4.663 
2083 5.180 4.667 
2084 5.184 4.671 
2085 5.186 4.673 
2086 5.188 4.675 
2087 5.189 4.677 
2088 5.191 4.679 
2089 5.193 4.681 
2090 5.195 4.682 
NOTE:  Methodology behind these numbers is explained in text.  The program is assumed to start in 2011 and be 
ongoing.  These numbers are used to generate Figure 7.5. 
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Table 7D.2  Ratio of Annual Economic Development Benefits to Costs, Abecedarian Program, with and 
without Adult Training Component 
Year 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
with adult training 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
without adult training 
2011 0.296 0.307 
2012 0.318 0.307 
2013 0.327 0.308 
2014 0.333 0.310 
2015 0.340 0.314 
2016 0.356 0.324 
2017 0.379 0.341 
2018 0.409 0.365 
2019 0.446 0.396 
2020 0.487 0.432 
2021 0.532 0.472 
2022 0.578 0.514 
2023 0.627 0.557 
2024 0.676 0.602 
2025 0.726 0.648 
2026 0.777 0.695 
2027 0.828 0.742 
2028 0.881 0.790 
2029 0.934 0.839 
2030 1.008 0.910 
2031 1.086 0.984 
2032 1.167 1.062 
2033 1.249 1.141 
2034 1.335 1.224 
2035 1.419 1.305 
2036 1.500 1.384 
2037 1.578 1.460 
2038 1.655 1.534 
2039 1.730 1.607 
2040 1.806 1.681 
2041 1.883 1.755 
2042 1.959 1.830 
2043 2.034 1.903 
2044 2.110 1.977 
2045 2.183 2.049 
2046 2.256 2.120 
2047 2.327 2.191 
2048 2.398 2.260 
2049 2.468 2.329 
2050 2.537 2.398 
2051 2.605 2.466 
2052 2.673 2.533 
Table 7D.2  (Continued) 
7D-6 
Year 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
with adult training 
Ratio of benefits to costs 
without adult training 
2053 2.740 2.599 
2054 2.805 2.663 
2055 2.867 2.725 
2056 2.926 2.785 
2057 2.984 2.843 
2058 3.039 2.897 
2059 3.091 2.949 
2060 3.140 2.999 
2061 3.188 3.047 
2062 3.231 3.090 
2063 3.272 3.132 
2064 3.310 3.170 
2065 3.345 3.205 
2066 3.375 3.236 
2067 3.403 3.263 
2068 3.427 3.288 
2069 3.450 3.311 
2070 3.469 3.331 
2071 3.485 3.347 
2072 3.500 3.361 
2073 3.512 3.374 
2074 3.522 3.385 
2075 3.531 3.394 
2076 3.538 3.401 
2077 3.544 3.406 
2078 3.548 3.411 
2079 3.551 3.414 
2080 3.553 3.416 
2081 3.554 3.416 
2082 3.553 3.416 
2083 3.553 3.415 
2084 3.551 3.414 
2085 3.549 3.412 
2086 3.547 3.409 
2087 3.544 3.406 
2088 3.540 3.403 
2089 3.537 3.399 
2090 3.533 3.395 
NOTE:  Methodology behind these numbers is explained in text.  The program is assumed to start in 2011 and be 
ongoing.  These numbers are used to generate Figure 7.6. 
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